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Abstract  
There are two targeting objectives for an election campaign: mobilizing core voters and 
chasing undecided voters. According to most previous research negative campaigning 
exclusively fulfils a chasing function; parties use it to convince swing voters. The article 
argues that parties consider the mobilization of core voters as a second important function 
of negative campaigning. It is based on interviews with party campaign officials and a 
content analysis of election newspaper advertisements and press releases from the 2011 
and 2015 Swiss National Council elections. The interviews and the analysis of parties’ 
attack behaviour show that, not only do parties use negative campaigning also for 
mobilizing purposes, but in the analysed Swiss elections it seems to be a more popular 
strategy than chasing.  
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Introduction 
According to Rohrschneider (2002) an election campaign has two objectives. The first is 
the mobilization of core voters and the second is the chasing of swing voters. Looking at 
previous research there seems to be no doubt that negative campaigning as an electoral 
strategy uniquely serves the second objective, allowing political parties to target  voters 
who are undecided between voting for the attacker and the targeted opponent. As Nai and 
Walter (2015: 12) summarize: ‘Scholars […] concur on its function: negative campaigning 
is a means to diminish the positive feelings voters might have towards a political opponent’. 
In this understanding, negative campaigning serves political parties to change voters’ 
feelings towards the attacked opponent, but is not intended to change or reinforce feelings 
towards the attacker. The only way negative campaigning is conceived of changing voters’ 
perception of the attacking party is in form of an unintended backlash effect because voters 
disapprove of mudslinging (Lau et al., 2007). Implicitly the target group of negative 
campaigning is therefore defined as swing voters that need to be convinced of not voting 
for the opponent, rather than core voters, who should be given reasons to stick with their 
traditional choice.  
This article aims to challenge that consensus by arguing that political parties make use of 
negative campaigning for both chasing and mobilizing purposes. The chasing functions of 
negative campaigning are not being called into question. Parties use attacks on their 
competitors to discredit them as valid alternatives and gain in relative popularity as well as 
to depress turnout among an opponent’s sympathizers. However, this does not preclude the 
possibility of a mobilizing purpose. Negative campaigning is an intuitive choice for a party 
to mobilize its core voters for two reasons. First, negative appeals can work as a boundary 
making mechanism that unites the party base, activating and reinforcing existing party 
preferences, by emphasizing the threat of the common enemy. Second, negativity has the 
power of involving people in politics. Research on the effects of negative campaigning, 
while divided, seems to show that rather than depressing turnout negative campaigning 
might have a mobilizing effect especially on partisans (Lau et al., 2007).  
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To test those arguments, this article combines a qualitative and quantitative approach. On 
the one hand, interviews with leading party campaign officials provide insights into parties’ 
reasoning behind their use of negative campaigning. On the other hand, a content analysis 
of election newspaper advertisements and parties’ press releases during the 2011 and 2015 
Swiss National Council elections allow for the analysis of parties’ actual attack behaviour. 
The empirical evidence suggests that, not only do parties use negative campaigning also 
for mobilizing purposes, but in the analysed election campaigns it is a more frequent 
strategy than chasing. The majority of interviewees argue that they use negative 
campaigning rather for mobilizing than chasing purposes. Contrary to chasing 
expectations, parties are less likely to attack opponents that share more of their voter base 
with the attacker. This is in line with a mobilizing logic, as this means that opponents that 
share less of their voter base with the attacker and which are more disliked by the attacker’s 
base are more likely to be attacked. Furthermore, the way parties make use of party 
categories supports the mobilizing functions of negative campaigning.  
This article makes an empirical contribution to the still small but growing literature on 
negative campaigning in multiparty systems. Theoretically and methodologically it adds to 
the broader negative campaigning literature by emphasizing the mobilizing functions of 
negative campaigning and showing the usefulness of a mixed-method approach.  
The article is structured as follows. First, the mobilizing and chasing functions of negative 
campaigning are presented and applied to the attack behaviour in a multiparty system. 
Second, the data, methods and operationalization of variables are discussed. Third, the 
findings from the Swiss case are presented and the implications of this study are 
highlighted in the concluding remarks.  
Theoretical Argument  
The functions of negative campaigning  
To maximize the impact of their campaign, parties are careful to adapt the message to the 
voters they want to reach. Most authors distinguish between two target groups: The core 
voters who are emotionally attached to you as a party and are normally voting for you in 
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each election and the swing voters who might vote for you or for an opponent, changing 
regularly their party preference (e.g. Albright, 2008; Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; 
Rohrschneider, 2002). The core voters of your opponents, the rival voters, constitute a third 
segment of the electorate (Bernhard, 2012), but as they are very likely to vote for an 
opponent they are normally not considered as a viable target group. According to 
Rohrschneider's (2002) mobilizing-chasing framework there are therefore two main 
objectives for a campaign: mobilizing core voters and chasing swing voters.  
On the level of an election campaign those two objectives can be combined and probably 
have to be combined if a party wants to win elections (Albright, 2008). However, because 
the two target groups differ there is a certain trade-off between appealing to them equally. 
Rohrschneider (2002) therefore suggests that election campaigns can be positioned on a 
continuum that ranges from an exclusive focus on core voters to an exclusive focus on 
swing voters. This same continuum can also be used not to characterize election campaigns 
but to assess individual electoral strategies like negative campaigning.  
Negative campaigning shall be defined here as any criticism parties or candidates voice 
against their opponents (Geer, 2006; Lau and Pomper, 2001). In research on parties’ 
strategic use of negative campaigning this is a largely undisputed definition. That literature 
focuses on ‘who’ adopts negative campaigning, ‘when’ and ‘where’ (e.g. Kahn and 
Kenney, 1999; Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995); Lau and Pomper 2001).  The ‘why’ is 
generally not an object of study as the functions of negative campaigning are taken as self-
evident. Besides the general function of making parties win elections (Lau and Pomper 
2001, Kahn and Kenney, 1999), the literature suggests two more precise functions. 
The first and most often discussed function is persuasion, i.e. changing voters’ party 
preferences in the attacker’s favour. As Walter et al. (2014: 551) explain it: ‘A party resorts 
to negative campaigning in an attempt to become voters’ preferred party by diminishing 
positive feelings for opposing candidates or parties’ (see also e.g. Doron and On, 1983; 
Skaperdas and Grofman, 1995; Nai and Walter, 2015). By defining the function of negative 
campaigning in terms of changing party preferences rather than in terms of activating and 
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reinforcing existing party preferences, the target group is implicitly defined as swing voters 
or in extension rival voters.  
The second function is not about influencing party preferences, but about influencing 
turnout. Ansolabehere et al. (1994) have famously argued that negative campaigning has a 
negative effect on turnout, initiating a debate about the implications of negative 
campaigning for democracy and leading multiple authors to argue that parties might use 
negative campaigning to depress turnout among supporters of the opponent (Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar, 1995; Malloy and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2016). This function therefore targets 
rival voters as well as swing voters who sympathize with the attacked opponent.  
By limiting the ‘why’ of negative campaigning to those two functions that are directed 
towards swing or rival voters, the literature conceives negative appeals as uniquely serving 
the objective of chasing.  Based on a Schattschneiderian view on conflict I argue that there 
are important theoretical reasons to believe that the literature is only partly right and that 
parties also use negative campaigning to mobilize core voters because it can serve to 
activate and reinforce party preferences and increase their base’s voter turnout.  
Negative campaigning is well positioned to fulfil the function of activation because as 
Schattschneider (1960: 62) argues ‘conflicts divide people and unite them at the same 
time’. A party by attacking another can define a conflict line that allows core voters to 
identify as ‘us’ against a ‘them’ identified in the attacked party and its supporters. By 
attacking an opponent whose ideas and interests supposedly threaten those held dear by the 
party and its potential electorate a party presents itself as the defenders of its core voters 
and provides reason for them to stick with their choice. This argument on the activation 
function of negative campaigning, while largely ignored, is not new. Budesheim et al. 
(1996: 532) already argue that negative campaigning in addition to undermining the 
opponent’s support can ‘strengthen the support from one’s own political in-group’. More 
recently Elmelund-Præstekær (2010: 143) emphasizes  that ‘a party might want to engage 
in negative campaigning in order to create a stronger party identification among its voters’ 
(see also Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1998).  
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‘The central political fact in a free society is the tremendous contagiousness of conflict’ 
(Schattschneider, 1960: 2). This Schattschneider quote points to the fact that negative 
campaigning, is a natural choice to increase voter turnout. A political fight like any other 
one draws attention, incites the crowd to take a side and indicates that something important 
is at stake. The non-discussion of this function in the party literature is surprising given the 
extended literature on the effects of negative appeals on voter turnout. Most recent studies 
in fact disagree with Ansolabehere et al.'s (1994) original argument that negative 
campaigning has a negative effect on turnout. Lau et al. (2007, 1184) conclude in their 
meta-analysis that the literature does not support the general demobilizing effect of 
negative campaigning, stating that ‘If anything, negative campaigning more frequently 
appears to have a slight mobilizing effect.’ The same meta-analysis also suggests that 
negative campaigning has a mobilizing effect specifically on partisans, while it might 
rather demobilize independents (Lau et al., 2007: 1185). Based on this literature negative 
campaigning seems to constitute an interesting option for parties to increase turnout among 
their base.  
Attack behaviour in multiparty systems    
In addition to insights from interviews with campaign officials, this analysis relies like 
other studies on parties’ campaign behaviour to infer their objectives (e.g. Doron and On, 
1983; Kahn and Kenney, 1999; Sigelman and Shiraev, 2002).  Multiparty systems force 
parties to choose the opponents they want to attack and therefore provide us with an 
observable targeting behaviour. The strategic choice of attacking one opponent rather than 
another affects the groups of voters that respond to the negative appeal because voters 
differ in the way they relate to the various political parties. The choice of target of negative 
campaigning is therefore a good indicator of parties’ strategies with regards to the voters 
they are trying to reach.  
The growing literature on negative campaigning in multiparty democracies (Curini and 
Martelli, 2010; Nai and Walter, 2015; Walter and Vliegenthart, 2010) largely agrees with 
the general literature dominated by studies on the U.S. two-party system on the chasing 
objective of negative campaigning: The main model to explain whom parties attack in 
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multiparty systems has been developed by Doron and On (1983). According to them, 
negative campaigning aims exclusively at discrediting one’s opponent. Therefore, they 
argue that parties are expected to attack ideologically proximate parties whose voters are 
open to the appeals of the attacker as well as big parties that offer a large voter pool.  
While this is a very popular model, empirical evidence in clear support of it is rare. Even 
in Doron and On's (1983) own analysis there are multiple parties that do not follow their 
model and most studies conducted since then do not provide more promising results. While 
Walter (2014) does confirm the Doron-On model (for valence attacks see also Curini and 
Martelli, 2010),  most authors either present mixed results (Haynes and Rhine, 1998; 
Sigelman and Shiraev, 2002), or find that parties and candidates are more likely to attack 
ideologically distant opponents (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1998; Ridout and Holland, 2010; 
Elmelund-Præstekær, 2008; Dolezal et al., 2015). In most of those studies, other factors 
than mobilization are used to explain the shortcomings of the Doron-On model. While 
Rideout and Holland (2010) point to ideological distance that increases the likelihood of 
disagreement, Elmelund-Præstekær (2008) argues that ideologically close opponents are 
not attacked for coalition considerations. A first exception is Walter (2014) who engages 
with the mobilizing argument but rejects it based on her findings. A second exception is 
Dolezal et al. (2015) who find that parties are slightly more likely to attack ideologically 
distant parties, which the authors explain based on a mobilizing intention. 
This research on attack behaviour in multiparty democracies shows that a model 
exclusively building on chasing intentions shows at best mixed results. To achieve a better 
performing model and a more complete understanding of negative campaigning, it is 
crucial to stop treating chasing and mobilizing as mutually exclusive objectives of negative 
campaigning.  
The chasing and mobilizing potential 
The aim is to understand the objectives behind negative campaigning based on the targets 
political parties choose in multiparty systems. The typical characteristics of a target for a 
chasing strategy is a party with a large share of voters who would potentially vote for the 
attacking party or that could attract a large share of voters from the attacker. In other words, 
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there is a large overlap of the two voter bases and the attacking party aims to use negative 
campaigning to sway those voters that could potentially vote for either one of the two 
parties. Such a target can be considered to have a high chasing potential.  
 The typical characteristics of a target for a mobilizing strategy is a party that is highly 
disliked by many supporters and sympathizers of the attacking party. By attacking such a 
target, a party aims to get their supporters and sympathizers to stick to their choice and to 
show up at election day. The logic behind it is that the more supporters and sympathizers 
dislike a party the more an attack on it convinces them that the attacker is on their side and 
that they should turn out to vote for it. In a mobilizing logic, the party aims to convince the 
voter that a vote for it is also a vote against the targeted opponent. A party is therefore 
considered to have a high mobilizing potential if many of the supporters and sympathizers 
of the attacker highly dislike it. It can generally be expected that if this is the case, those 
negative feelings are shared by supporters and sympathisers of the targeted party, which 
means that there is only a small overlap of the voter base of the attacker and that of an 
opponent with a high mobilizing potential. A target that has a high mobilizing potential 
can therefore be expected to have a low chasing potential and vice versa. An attack aimed 
for mobilization has the advantage, that its costs in terms of a backlash effect should be 
lower, as most of potential supporters of the attacking party already clearly dislike the 
targeted opponent.  
[TABLE 1] 
The presented mobilizing-chasing framework expects parties to use both chasing and 
mobilizing strategies in their use of negative campaigning. However, for the case of 
Switzerland I expect that the mobilizing strategy will be more important. The reason is first 
that as has shown the literature review, previous studies have rarely found that parties 
attack ideological close opponents, i.e. chasing targets, more often. Second, in Switzerland 
the most important parties all are in government. This means that parties can less easily 
attack the record of opponents, something that is very useful for chasing attacks and less 
necessary for attacks on parties with whom one anyway shares less ideologically.   
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Hypothesis: Opponents with a high mobilizing and low chasing potential, i.e. that share 
less of their voter base with the attacker, are more likely to be targeted.  
Data and Method 
This study analyses negative campaigning in Switzerland based on the 2011 and 2015 
elections to the National Council, the lower house of the parliament. Switzerland is a 
consensus democracy with the (informal) rule of concordance government (Lijphart, 
1999), meaning that the most important parties are represented in the government 
constituted by seven federal councils elected by the parliament. The Swiss political system 
is characterized by a proportional electoral system and strong multipartism, which allows 
for the exploration of parties’ choices regarding the targets of their negative appeals.  
To explore party strategies this article relies on qualitative data from interviews as well as 
quantitative data from the content analysis of campaign material. Semi-structured, face-to-
face interviews have been conducted in the first months of 2018 with a leading member of 
the campaign team from all seven parties except for the radical right-wing Swiss People’s 
Party, which refused to participate in this study.1 As has been shown previously, interviews 
can be a useful method to understand the targeting objectives of political parties (Albright, 
2008), and can complement the analysis of campaign material (Kahn and Kenney, 1999). 
The two data sources for the content analysis are newspaper advertisements and press 
releases. As we are interested in the targets of negative campaigns rather than in the general 
level of negativity in Swiss election campaigns our data sources include the more 
confrontational communication channels and ignore sources which can be expected to 
contain fewer negative appeals such as party manifestos (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2010). This 
study uses newspaper ads rather than the often-analysed TV ads because the latter are 
forbidden in Switzerland. Newspaper ads, however, provide the same advantages as TV 
ads: they are party controlled communication channels and can in contrast to for example 
party posters, be judged on their importance based on their frequency of appearance.  All 
ads, including identical ones that appeared on different days or in different newspapers, are 
taken into account. The database of newspaper ads (2011 N= 2560, 2015 N=4277) provides 
a very extensive view on the 2011 and 2015 National Council elections covering more than 
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20 French- and German-speaking Swiss newspapers over a time period of up to four 
months before Election Day.2 The analysis is limited to the advertisements of the seven 
biggest parties and their candidates which combine a vote share of over 90%.  
As only three out of seven parties ran negative ads and not in high numbers, this study 
includes press releases as a further data source in order to increase the validity of findings. 
The press releases of the seven biggest parties are analysed for the period of two months 
before Election Day. While the number of press releases is limited (2011 N=218, 2015 
N=166), this data source has the advantage compared to for example press articles that it 
is party controlled and therefore comparable to ads.  
Method 
The voter targeting objectives of negative campaigning are explored qualitatively based on 
the following interview question: “Regarding the objectives of such criticism [of your 
opponents]: Would you rather do it to energize your base or rather to attract voters that 
might vote for that opponent instead of your party?” Additionally, relevant information 
that the respondents gave at other moments in the interviews, which revolved around 
questions of campaign strategies, is used as well. The interviews focused on the 2015 
campaign and the answers should be interpreted as being valid for that context. 
The parties’ use of negative campaigning in the 2011 and 2015 Swiss National Council 
elections is analysed quantitatively based on a content analysis of newspaper ads and press 
releases. Both data sources were hand-coded by a single coder. The unit of analysis is a 
negative appeal (Geer, 2006), which is any criticism of another party or a party category.	
Coded are not only the criticism parties voice against individual parties but also criticism 
parties voice against groups of opponents. Specifically, the following four categories have 
been identified: ‘left-wing parties’, ‘centre parties’, ‘right-wing parties’ and ‘all other 
parties’. Those categories are not just concepts used in political science, but they are, as 
‘categories of practice’ (Brubaker, 2004: 31), part of the vocabulary political parties 
employ in their election campaigns. The literature on negative campaigning is mostly silent 
on those categories, and it is unclear if authors generally exclude them from analysis or 
that attacks against them are simply counted as separate attacks against the parties 
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comprised in the category (for the latter see Walter, 2014). They will be taken into account 
in this study because they play an important role in the Swiss case and might be expected 
to be used differently in terms of mobilizing and chasing than individual parties.  
Criticisms directed at members of the Federal Council are treated as attacks on the 
respective parties. However, attacks against the government are not coded because of the 
consensual Swiss system, which makes it more difficult to interpret the critique of 
government as targeting the other parties. In the case that a party is not mentioned by name 
but the target of the attack can undoubtedly be identified, negative appeals are coded as 
well.  
As negative campaigning is always directed against another party, each observation is 
given by a dyad of an attacking party and a targeted opponent. The objective is to measure 
the likelihood of the presence of an attack for the different types of dyads. Therefore the 
dataset includes for each observed attack from a particular party, all the possible alternative 
attacks that party could have made against other targets (for the same approach see Walter, 
2014).3 In the model with the other parties as targets, for each attack five non-attacks are 
coded consisting of dyads between the attacker and each of the five parties that are neither 
the attacker not the attacked. In the model with three party categories as targets, for each 
attack two non-attacks are coded consisting of dyads between the attacker and each of the 
non-targeted categories. The resulting dataset is analysed with a logistic regression, in 
which, because the attacks and non-attacks of a particular party are not independent 
observations, the standard errors are clustered.  
Operationalization of independent variables 
The main variables of interest are the chasing and mobilizing potentials of a targeted party. 
Previous studies, starting with Doron and On (1983), have measured chasing and if 
considered mobilizing potentials based on ideological distance (e.g. Dolezal et al., 2015; 
Walter, 2014) The reasonable assumption is that ideologically close parties do share a 
bigger voter base with the attacker than ideologically distant parties and therefore have a 
bigger chasing potential. Ideologically distant parties are generally more disliked by voters 
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of your own parties and serve therefore better the purpose of a mobilizing strategy. 
Ideological distance however is quite a crude measure of chasing and mobilizing potentials. 
Ideological distance might not measure what is really important for a voter to vote for a 
party or for a voter to really dislike a party. This study therefore suggests a more reliable 
measure of the shared voter base between parties, namely voters’ expression of likelihood 
to vote for parties. The measurement of the shared voter base of two parties contains two 
elements. The first is the percentage of voters of the targeted party that considers it likely 
that he or she would vote for the attacking party.4 For each election year, 2011 and 2015, 
this is measured based on survey data from the previous elections, using the 2007 and 2011 
Swiss election studies SELECTS (Selects, 2009, 2012). 5  In those surveys voters6 of each 
party were asked about the likelihood of voting for the other parties. Likely means here 
that voters choose a value of 7 or higher on a scale from 0 to 10. The second element is the 
percentage of voters of the attacking party that considers it likely that he or she would vote 
for the targeted party. This is based on the same survey measures. The sum of those two 
elements than provides a measure of the extent of the overlap of the two voter bases. This 
indicator shows on the one hand a target’s chasing potential, the voters a party might gain 
from or lose to a party. On the other hand, the shared voter base also shows a target’s 
mobilizing potential, because it strongly correlates negatively with the percentage of voters 
of the attacker that dislike, i.e. are unlikely to vote for (value of 3 or below on a scale from 
0 to 10), the targeted party (Pearson’s r: -0.81). The shared voter base is therefore a positive 
indicator of chasing potential and a negative one of mobilizing potential.  
As all previous studies have used ideological distance as a measurement it will also be 
included here in order to assure comparability. The measurement of ideological distance is 
based on the 2010 and 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2014). The survey’s 
results allow the positioning of parties not only along the classical economic left-right 
dimension but also along the cultural libertarian-authoritarian dimension. This gives a more 
precise picture of the positions of parties in the two-dimensional Swiss political landscape 
(Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012). Based on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the ideological distance 
between two parties is calculated as the geometric distance between their positions in the 
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two-dimensional space defined by the economic dimension (LRECON) and the cultural 
dimension (GALTAN).   
In order to test convincingly the influence of the chasing and mobilizing potential on 
parties’ attack behaviour it is important to control for other factors that might be more 
indirectly linked to voter targeting or that might suggest that the attack behaviour is 
influenced by variables unrelated to voter targeting. A first such factor is the size of the 
targeted opponent. Attacks on large parties might be considered to be an indication of a 
chasing strategy as such parties carry many voters (Walter, 2014). However, it might also 
be an indication of a mobilizing strategy, as large parties can be presented as a bigger threat 
to one’s voters. Size is therefore not a good indicator for chasing or mobilizing objectives. 
Furthermore large parties might also be attacked for other reasons like a better chance for 
media attention (Dolezal et al., 2015). Party size is measured based on the last election 
results.7 A second factor which is often studied and which falls within the lines of a chasing 
framework is poll standing. The argument is that parties that are winning in the polls, either 
absolutely or compared to their last election results, are more likely to be attacked because 
they have a large or increasing voter base (Ridout and Holland, 2010; Skaperdas and 
Grofman, 1995; Walter, 2014). Poll standing is measured as the difference between the 
poll results (an average of four poll results published up to four months before the elections 
Longchamp et al. (2011)) and the last election results.  
A final factor is the government status of the targeted party. Existing research shows that 
government parties are more frequently exposed to attacks (Sigelman and Shiraev, 2002; 
Walter, 2014). This might be interpreted in line with the chasing idea, arguing that 
incumbents are attacked because they have been most successful in the last election and 
therefore have the biggest voter potential (Walter, 2014). A second interpretation is  that it 
simply reflects the nature of elections as a fight between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ which forces 
incumbents to defend their policies and challengers to criticize them (Sigelman and 
Shiraev, 2002; Walter, 2014). Government status is measured with a dichotomic variable, 
which takes the value of 1, if the targeted party is part of the government.  
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Findings  
Interviews  
The interviews show that in the context of the 2015 election campaign parties’ campaign 
officials in Switzerland conceived of the targeting objectives of negative campaigning 
mostly in terms of mobilizing. Two representatives, one from a centrist party and the other 
from a pole party, argued that if they use negative campaigning that they would rather do 
it to chase voters from an opponent.8 The other four interviewees responded that they would 
rather use negative campaigning to mobilize their own base.9 Two campaign officials, both 
from parties more to the poles of the ideological spectrum, explicitly rejected the possibility 
to use criticism of other parties to chase other parties’ voters.10 One of them who made the 
most extensive remarks on the subject argued as follows: “[It is impossible] to explain to 
someone that the party for which he has voted for 10 years, is, excuse the expression, shit. 
He won’t buy that. […] You have to be careful not to make your potential voter angry. You 
have to embrace him and not beat him.”11  
The interviews also provided insights into targets of negative appeals intended for 
mobilizing. The same campaigner added that, mobilizing their base is only possible with 
attacks on their ‘natural opponent’, who has no overlap with them in terms of voter base 
and with whom they can publicly fight without negative consequences. There it works 
according to this interviewee because they can present this party as the evil bogeyman and 
their base agrees unanimously that the political project proposed by this opponent should 
be opposed. The data on attack behaviour of political parties, analysed in the next section 
did indeed show for this party a strong focus on this opponent on the other side of the 
political spectrum. More generally, this can make us more confident to interpret attacks on 
opponents with a small overlapping voter base as having a mobilizing intention.  
Overall the interviews show that for political parties mobilizing their own base can be an 
objective of negative appeals. In Switzerland, in the context of the 2015 campaign, this is 
judged to be more important by most interviewed campaign officials than chasing.  
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Attack behaviour - Targeting parties 
After having discussed the objectives of negative campaigning as argued by campaign 
officials, I turn now to the analysis of parties’ campaign behaviour. Table 2 shows the 
results of the logistic regression on the attack behaviour in the Swiss parliamentary 
elections 2011and 2015 (for a descriptive overview see Appendix A.1). The first model 
indicates that while controlling for poll standing, government status and party size, the 
shared voter base has a statistically significant negative effect.12 This means that the smaller 
the shared voter base, i.e. the higher the mobilizing potential and the lower the chasing 
potential, the higher is the likelihood of attacks. In order to allow for a comparison with 
earlier studies (e.g. Doron and On, 1983; Walter, 2014), the second model relies on 
ideological distance as an alternative proxy for chasing and mobilizing purposes. The 
results show that in line with the results of the first model, ideological distance, with the 
same controls as in model 1, has a statistically significant positive effect. The larger the 
ideological distance between attacker and targeted opponent, the more likely becomes an 
attack. These results further challenge the idea that negative campaigning is exclusively 
used for chasing purposes. They reinforce the argument already supported by the 
interviews that in Switzerland negative campaigning is indeed used for mobilizing 
purposes and that in this context the mobilizing strategy is more important than the chasing 
strategy. Importantly, this model shows an average effect. Attacks following the chasing 
logic also exist. For example, in a 2011 ad, the Liberal party attacked the small but 
upcoming Green-Liberal party, that shares many potential voters with the Liberal party, 
clearly targeting voters that were considering voting for either of the two parties (FDP.The 
Liberals, 2011). Furthermore, poll standing does have a positive effect, which is in line 
with a chasing perspective. As already have been found in other studies (Dolezal et al., 
2015; Sigelman and Shiraev, 2002; Walter, 2014), government status and party size also 
have statistically significant effects. To what extent this is due to mobilizing, chasing or 
other factors is however more difficult to establish.  
[Table 2] 
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While the literature presents a mixed picture with regard to the effect of ideological 
distance, the presented finding are in line with the finding of various studies on attack 
behaviour in multi-actor contexts (Dolezal et al., 2015; Elmelund-Præstekær, 2008; Ridout 
and Holland, 2010). However, those studies, with the exception of Dolezal et al. (2015), 
don’t share the interpretation that the results are due to mobilizing efforts. In the following 
it is therefore necessary to discuss three alternative interpretations. A first counter-
argument to the mobilizing interpretation is that, this attack behaviour is simply due to the 
fact that parties fear a backlash effect if they attack a party that is ideologically close. This 
backlash effect would come either from their voters who are sympathetic to ideologically 
close parties (Lau et al., 2007), or from the parties themselves that are potential coalition 
partners (Elmelund-Præstekær, 2008). The coalition potential is in the Swiss case a weak 
argument, given that coalition calculations play a small role due to the stable composition 
of the Swiss government, the absence of coalition programs, as well as the institutional and 
temporal separation of parliamentary elections and the election of the federal council (Bol 
and Bohl, 2015). The fear of a backlash from voters is a more convincing argument which 
is supported by the comments made by one of the campaign officials that they are much 
freer to attack their ‘natural opponent’ because they have only a small shared voter base 
and therefore have to fear less of a backlash. However, the weakness of both backlash 
arguments is that while they can tell us why parties would not want to attack ideologically 
close parties, they struggle to tell us why parties would have an interest in attacking parties 
with unattractive voter bases.  
A second counter-argument is that parties are attacking opponents with whom they share 
only a small voter base not for voter targeting purposes, but simply because they find more 
to disagree with those parties (Ridout and Holland, 2010). This is certainly a valid 
argument and one can expect that it explains part of the discussed pattern of attacks. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility that this criticism is used by political parties 
during electoral campaigns strategically, as is suggested by the interviews with party 
officials.  
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A third counter-argument is that the intention behind the observed behaviour is actually to 
demobilize the voters of the attacked party. This interpretation is not fully convincing since 
those targeted opponents seem not the best target for such a purpose. According to Martin 
(2004) most authors who defend the demobilization hypothesis “make a case that citizens 
are repulsed by candidates attacking one another”. However, if attacks come from 
ideologically distant parties, one would expect that the negative reaction would be less 
pronounced as such a behaviour seems more acceptable. Furthermore, the voters of such 
an ideologically distant party are the ones least likely to be open for arguments from such 
an attacker and risk to be mobilized by such an attack. Finally, it should be noted that party 
officials were not particularly asked about demobilization, and none of them mentioned it 
in unstructured remarks. 
Attack behaviour - Targeting Categories 
Parties do not only attack individual parties, but also attack party categories. In the Swiss 
case, those kinds of attacks constituted 47 per cent of all attacks. They use three categories 
that separate the political space into different parts, the left, the centre and the right. The 
results of the logistic regression displayed in table 3 shows that with regard to those three 
categories, parties are more likely to attack the opposite category than the adjacent 
category, which is the reference category, or the category they belong to themselves. This 
pattern supports the mobilizing hypothesis with regard to categories because those opposite 
categories seem very unhandy for a chasing strategy and very useful for a mobilizing effort 
trough their threat potential. The radical right-wing Swiss People’s party (SVP) ran for 
example an ad with the title: ‘This is what the left, do-gooders and their experts want: Ivan 
S. should carry on raping’ (Swiss People’s Party, 2011). This is hardly an appeal to left-
wing voters, but it allows the party to present itself as the protector of those who fear 
allegedly left-wing policies. Similarly, the Social Democrats warned in a press release: ‘If 
things go according to the plans of the right-wing parties, after the elections there will 
apparently be yet another attack on the social security system. [...] The SPS will stop those 
attacks’ (Social Democratic Party, 2011).  
[Table 3] 
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There is one category that has not been discussed, which is ‘all other parties’. This is a 
particular category, because of its nature – it englobes everyone except the attacker – and 
because in the Swiss context the radical right-wing Swiss People’s party (SVP) is in 99% 
of the cases the sender. For this party, ‘all other parties’ is overall the most important target 
which testifies to the populist character of this party that tries to position itself against all 
the other parties. More interestingly for our argument, when thinking in terms of voter 
targeting this seems to be a target that has a high mobilizing potential due to its threat 
potential and has rather unclear chasing benefits as its vagueness is unlikely to persuade 
voters considering to vote for another party.  
Conclusion 
The largely uncontested consensus in the literature on negative campaigning is that the 
exclusive objective of negative campaigning is to chase swing voters. This study has 
argued that there are good theoretical reasons to expect parties to use negative campaigning 
also to mobilize core voters because it can activate and reinforce party preferences and 
increase voter turnout. The results from interviews with party officials and the analysis of 
the attack behaviour during the 2011 and 2015 Swiss national elections support this 
argument. They suggest, that in this case study negative campaigning is dominantly used 
for mobilizing and not for chasing purposes.  
This study hopes to contribute to a stronger theorization of negative campaigning that 
acknowledges its mobilizing functions. This can help us to better understand not only the 
attack behaviour in multiparty systems, but more generally when, where and by whom 
negative campaigning is used. At the same time, there is still much to be explored with 
regard to the contextual conditions and party characteristics that foster or impede the use 
of negative campaigning for mobilizing or chasing purposes.  
This article is based on a single-country study and one should be careful in generalizing 
the presented findings. The Swiss case is particular, because of the comparatively low level 
of negativity, evidenced in the quantitative data as well as confirmed by campaign officials 
who mostly consider it of low importance.  Furthermore, attack behaviour in Switzerland 
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is less dominated by an opposition-government polarization, because the electorally most 
important parties belong to the government, This polarization is an important way for 
parties that share a large voter base to distinguish themselves from each other and its lower 
salience in the Swiss case might have contributed to the lower importance of the chasing 
strategy. More generally it should be noted that the importance of the mobilizing strategy 
or the use of party categories might vary considerably depending on the country and the 
party system. However, there are strong reasons to assume that the mobilizing functions of 
negative campaigning are valid beyond the context of this study. Besides the theoretical 
arguments and the literature on the effects of negative campaigning, there is a long tradition 
of studies that have found that parties’ attack behaviour in multi-party democracies does 
not fit the rationale of an exclusive chasing purpose. With the argument that parties use 
negative campaigning as a means to mobilize their own supporters and sympathizers, this 
article provides an answer to the misfit between the results of this study and earlier work 
and the chasing expectations generally accepted in the literature. 
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Notes 
1 Interviews have been conducted by the author and another researcher in the context of 
project X.  
2 The database has been made available to the author by X. The over 20 covered 
newspapers include quality newspapers such as Neue Zürcher Zeitung and Le Temps as 
well as boulevard newspapers such as Blick and Le Matin. 
3 Dolezal et al. (2015) suggest an alternative way to build a dataset with this kind of data, 
by calculating the share of attacks from a particular party that is directed to each possible 
target. The party model (Table 2) has been replicated according to their method and the 
results confirm the robustness of the results, with the exception of government status that 
is not significant (p=0.083). The results are available from the author upon request.   
4 The phrasing of the question is: ‘Please tell me how high the likelihood is that you will 
ever vote for that party, 0 means that the likelihood that you will vote for that party is 
very low, 10 means that the likelihood is very high’.   
5 The exceptions are the small new centrist parties the Conservative Democratic Party 
and the Green Liberal Party, on which there are no data for 2007 and for which the values 
from the 2011 SELECTS survey have been used for both election campaigns.  
6 Non-voters are also included in the data. They are considered as voters of the party, that 
they indicated as the one they would have voted for. 
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7 The average of poll results was used as indicator for the size of the new centrist 
Conservative Democratic Party, as no previous election results were available for the 
2011 campaign.  
8 Two interviews conducted on 13 February 2018. 
9 Four interviews conducted on 15 January 2018, 9 February 2018, 10 February 2018, 11 
February 2018. 
10 Interviews conducted on 15 January 2018 and 9 February 2018. 
11 Interview conducted on 9 February 2018. 
12 This also holds true when separate analyses are performed for the two data sources. 
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Mobilizing Chasing 
Target group Core voters Swing voters
Function Activation Persuasion
Increase turnout Decrease turnout
Targeted opponents High mobilizing potential: 
Small overlap of voter 
bases
High chasing potential: 
Large overlap of voter bases
Table 1. The mobilizing-chasing framework applied to negative campaigning 
in multiparty systems
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
Shared voter base -0.0889***
(0.00739)
Ideological Distance 0.413***
(0.0313)
Size 0.226*** 0.229***
(0.0148) (0.0166)
Poll standing 1.208*** 1.416***
(0.0801) (0.102)
Government Party 1.813*** 2.585***
(0.459) (0.436)
Year (2015) -0.546*** -0.217*
(0.104) (0.102)
Constant -4.448*** -10.35***
(0.489) (0.606)
Observations 3,348 3,348
Cluster 558 558
McFadden 0.457 0.427
AIC 1638 1730
Notes: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the 
presence or absence of an attack. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clusters. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05                                
Table 2. Predicting attacks on other parties in the 
2011 and 2015 Swiss national elections
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES
Categories (Ref: Adjacent cat)
     Own category -0.949***
(0.275)
     Opposite category 2.499***
(0.269)
Year (2015) 0.0139
(0.101)
Constant -1.427***
(0.158)
Observations 639
Cluster 213
McFadden 0.299
AIC 570.4
Notes: Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients with 
standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the 
presence or absence of an attack. Standard errors are 
adjusted for clusters. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,  * p<0.05                                 
Table 3 Predicting attacks on party categories in 
the 2011 and 2015 Swiss national elections
A.1.		Targets	of	negative	campaigning	in	2011	and	2015	in	newspaper	advertisements	and	press	releases	(in	%)
Target SPS GPS GLP CVP FDP BDP SVP l-w	parties centre	parties r-w	parties the	other	parties Total N
SourceSocial	Democrats	(SPS) 0 0 0 8 22 0 25 0 0 45 0 100 114Green	Party	(GPS) 0 0 4 20 20 4 27 0 0 18 7 100 45Green-Liberal	Party	(GLP) 0 0 0 11 33 17 17 6 0 17 0 100 18Christian	Democrats	(CVP) 7 2 0 0 5 0 21 33 0 33 0 100 43Liberal	Party	(FDP) 73 1 2 2 0 1 13 6 1 1 0 100 347Conservative	Party	(BDP) 22 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 44 0 100 9Radical	Right-wing	Party	(SVP) 19 0 0 1 2 0 0 13 6 0 59 100 484
Note:	The	units	of	analysis	are	negative	appeals	(N=1060).
